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Abstract
Recent authors have raised objections to the counterfactual interpretation of the Aharonov-
Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule of time symmetrized quantum theory (TSQT). I distinguish between
two different readings of the ABL rule, counterfactual and non-counterfactual, and confirm that
TSQT advocate L. Vaidman is employing the counterfactual reading to which these authors object.
Vaidman has responded to the objections by proposing a new kind of time-symmetrized counter-
factual, which he has defined in two different ways. It is argued that neither definition succeeds in
overcoming the objections, except in a limited special case previously noted by Cohen and Hiley.
In addition, a connection is made between TSQT and Price’s concept of ‘advanced action’, which
further supports the special case discussed.
1. Introduction.
Time-Symmetrized Quantum Theory (hereinafter TSQT) was first introduced by Aharonov,
Bergmann and Lebowitz (1964), and most recently defended by Vaidman (1996a, 1997a,b).
The basic claim of TSQT (actually a novel interpretation of quantum theory) is that a
fundamental time symmetry applies to the interval between two ideal measurements. Ac-
cording to TSQT, the maximally specified quantum state of a system between two mea-
surements occurring at times t1 and t2 contains information based not only on the initial,
or pre-selection measurement (yielding the state |ψ1(t1)〉) but also on the final, or post-
selection measurement (yielding the state |ψ2(t2)〉). Ensembles of systems identified in this
way are referred to as “pre- and post-selected ensembles.” Aharonov and Vaidman (1991)
proposed that such ensembles be represented by a two-state vector, or “generalized state”
Ψ(t) = 〈ψ2(t)||ψ1(t)〉, where |ψ1(t)〉 = U(t, t1)|ψ1(t1)〉, and 〈ψ2(t)| = 〈ψ2(t2)|U(t2, t). The
propagator U(t2, t) represents a time-reversed evolution.
The novel philosophical claim of TSQT, as compared to most of the traditional in-
terpretations of quantum mechanics– including interpretations as diverse as the Copen-
hagen interpretation, many worlds theories, and hidden variables theories such as Bohm’s
theory–is that the ontological state of a quantum system has a causal dependence not
only on past measurements, but on measurements to be made in its immediate future. In
this respect, TSQT advocates have much in common with the philosophy of time of Price
∗rkastner@wam.umd.edu
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(1996), who argues that a fundamental time symmetry holds at the quantum level and
that the world exhibits what he calls “advanced action,” essentially backwards causality.
Indeed, Vaidman himself notes that the TSQT formalism “is not too far from the spirit
of [Price’s] ‘advanced action’....” (1996, footnote 6). This connection between advanced
action and TSQT will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.
Sections 2 and 3 of the paper will focus on the claim of Sharp and Shanks (1993) to have
refuted TSQT. It will be argued that, despite Vaidman’s arguments to the contrary (1996a,
1997a,b), these authors have successfully refuted a broad claim of the theory: namely, the
assertion that a probability rule derived by Aharonov, Bergmann and Lebowitz in their
(1964)–hereinafter ‘the ABL rule– can be universally applied to counterfactual measure-
ments at times between the pre- and post-selection measurements. Section 4 discusses a
special case, also noted in a slightly different context by Cohen (1995) and Cohen and
Hiley (1996), in which the Sharp and Shanks criticism fails and the counterfactual usage
of the ABL rule is valid.
2. TSQT and counterfactual claims.
In this section, I first review the ABL rule for calculating the probability of a given
outcome of a measurement occurring between pre- and post-selection measurements. I
then discuss proposed interpretations of the ABL rule. I distinguish between two readings,
non-counterfactual and counterfactual. The non-counterfactual version is trivially correct;
I argue that Vaidman is in fact employing the counterfactual version. Subsequently, I
review the Sharp and Shanks proof that the counterfactual use of the ABL rule gives
results inconsistent with quantum mechanics, and Vaidman’s counterarguments. I show
that both of his arguments fail: one (henceforth called “counterargument I”) relies on
the possibility of allowing for a counterfactual with true antecedent which I argue is
irrelevant to the counterfactual usage under debate, and the other (henceforth called
“counterargument II”) fails to solve (or even to take into account) the cotenability problem
which is at the root of the general inapplicability of a counterfactual usage of the ABL
rule.
The original ABL paper (1964) derived an expression for the probability of an outcome
cj of a measurement of a non-degenerate observable C with eigenvalues {ci} at a time
t between pre- and post-selection measurements at times t1 and t2 (t1 < t < t2). This
expression, subsequently known as the ABL rule, is an uncontroversial result of quantum
mechanics, applied to the situation in which the intervening C measurement has actually
occurred. In the case of zero Hamiltonian, which is sufficient for the purposes of this
paper, the rule states that the probability of outcome cj in the case of a preselection for
the state |a〉 and a post-selection for the state |b〉 is given by:
PABL(cj|a, b) =
|〈b|cj〉|
2|〈cj|a〉|
2∑
i |〈b|ci〉|
2|〈ci|a〉|2
(1)
More recently, some authors (Albert, Aharonov and D’Amato, 1985; hereinafter AAD)
began to make explicit use of a counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule. Rather
than just using the rule to retrodict the probability of an outcome cj for a measurement
of C which was actually carried out, AAD argued that the rule could be interpreted as
“the probability....that a measurement of some complete set of observables C within [the
interval (t1, t2)], if it were carried out, would find that C = cj” (1985, p. 5).
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For clarity, I shall distinguish between two different readings of the ABL rule which, at
first sight, both appear to be counterfactual. The first, non-counterfactual, reading asserts
for a suitably pre- and post-selected system and noncommuting observables X, Y ,....:
“If a measurement of X was performed at time t, then the probability that result
x was obtained is p(x); and if a measurement of Y was performed at time t, then
the probability that result y was obtained is p(y), and if....”
Such a non-counterfactual reading is discussed in Mermin (1997). It is essentially a
conjunction of material conditionals, only one of which is non-vacuously true, because
only one of the antecedents can be true at time t.
A second reading of the ABL rule, the bona fide counterfactual usage, asserts that for
any observable X , the ABL probability gives the correct probability that the property
associated with eigenvalue x is possessed by the system. Thus, the counterfactual usage
makes the following counterfactual prediction for a given pre- and post-selected system:
“If I had performed a measurement of observable X on the system at time t, then
the probability of the result x would have been p(x), where X is any observable.”
This is the type of claim being made in AAD (1985) as noted above. The counterfactual
reading is also used, for example, by Aharonov and Vaidman (1991) to argue that a single
particle with suitably pre- and post-selected states can be found with certainty in N
separate boxes, as well as in other examples of ‘curious’ quantum effects involving pre-
and post-selected ensembles.1
The possibility of the above two distinct readings of the ABL rule (1) arises because
of quantifier ambiguity in the expression PABL(cj|a, b). (In the following we omit the
ABL subscript for brevity.) As originally derived, this expression is actually shorthand
for P (cj|a, b;C), where C is the observable actually measured at time t, t1 < t < t2,
in the selection of a particular system with generalized state 〈b‖a〉. Thus the explicitly
characterized ABL rule is:
P (cj|a, b;C) =
|〈b|cj〉|
2|〈cj|a〉|
2∑
i |〈b|ci〉|2|〈ci|a〉|2
(1′)
Omission of the parameter C as in (1) creates an ambiguity in the variable cj: namely,
whether or not it represents values of the observable actually measured. To make this
ambiguity more evident, we will from now on use the parameter C to indicate the ob-
servable that is actually measured at time t, and replace the variable cj with the more
general variable xj ; i.e., xj might represent a value from some observable O rather than
C. Thus the explicitly ambiguous form of the ABL rule can be written as:
P (xj|a, b;C) =
|〈b|xj〉|
2|〈xj|a〉|
2∑
i |〈b|xi〉|2|〈xi|a〉|2
(1′′)
An equation like (1′′) is always understood as implicitly quantified. The two different
readings correspond to two different quantifications. Specifically, the non-counterfactual
reading asserts that equation (1′′) holds for all a, b ∈ S, all C ∈ O, and all xj ∈ R(C),
1The argument crucially depends on the assumption that the given particle has legitimate counterfac-
tual ABL probabilities for different possible intervening measurements.
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where S is the set of pure states, O is the set of observables, and R(C) is the range of
values of C. (The possibility that no measurement was performed at time t is covered if
we include the identity I in the set O.)
The counterfactual reading differs from the above in that equation (1′′) is asserted to
hold for all a, b ∈ S, all C ∈ O, and all xj ∈ R(O), for all O ∈ O, including the cases
where O 6= C. Thus the counterfactual reading allows xj to vary over the values of
observables that were not actually measured at time t–and, of course, there is a fact of
the matter as to whether or not a measurement was performed at time t, and if so, which
observable was measured.
Vaidman (1996b) effectively employs the counterfactual reading by arguing in his dis-
cussion of a single particle inside three boxes that the outcomes receiving probability one
according to the ABL rule correspond to ‘elements of reality’ for that particle:
“Elements of reality in the pre- and post-selected situations might be very peculiar.
One such example is a single particle inside three boxes A, B, and C, with two elements
of reality: ‘the particle is in box A’ and ‘the particle is in box B’ ...If in the intermediate
time it was searched for in box A, it has to be there with probability one, and if, instead,
it was searched for in box B, it has to be found there too with probability one.”2
This usage clearly implies that the properties of being in box A or being in box B are
considered as possessed by the same pre- and post-selected particle. Since a measurement
of some observable O was in fact performed at time t between the pre- and post- selection
of the particle (where O is either the observable associated with the particle being in box
A, or the observable associated with the particle being in box B), or no measurement was
performed (in which case O = I), it is clear that Vaidman is allowing xj to vary over
the values of observables O′ 6= O that were not actually measured between the pre- and
post-selection of that particular particle. 3
However, Sharp and Shanks (1993, hereinafter S&S) present a proof that the counter-
factual interpretation of the ABL rule leads to predictions incompatible with quantum
mechanics. They consider an ensemble of spin-1
2
particles prepared at time t1 in the state
|a1〉 (read as ‘spin up along direction a’). They then assume that this ensemble is sub-
jected to a final post- selection spin measurement at time t2 along direction b (i.e., the
observable σb is measured). This measurement yields a mixture, which we shall call M,
consisting of two subensembles Ei, i = 1, 2, described by the two-state vectors 〈bi‖a1〉,
where the subscript 2 denotes spin down. The weight of each subensemble Ei is given by
|〈bi|a1〉|
2. (See Figure 1.)
2Vaidman (1996b), p. 900. Vaidman uses box numbers instead of letters; I modify this for uniformity
of notation.
3The phrase, “If, instead, it was searched for in box B” directly trades on the ambiguity concerning
whether the B measurement was actually performed in the selection of that particle. If this is the case,
the left hand side of the ABL rule as formulated in (1′′) becomes P (b|ψ1, ψ2;B) (with ψ1 and ψ2 being
the pre- and post-selected states, respectively, and b the eigenvalue corresponding to finding the particle
in box B): the non-counterfactual reading. But if one can use the non-counterfactual reading for the
B ‘element of reality,’ then one is committed to the B measurement being the one which was actually
performed in the selection of the given particle. Then the proposition concerning the A ‘element of reality’
uses the counterfactual reading, since the left hand side of (1′′) in this case would be P (a|ψ1, ψ2;B), a
being the eigenvalue corresponding to finding the particle in box A; and a is not in the range of values
of B. The analogous argument applies to the case in which A is the observable actually measured.
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Figure 1
|a1〉
|b1〉, E1 : Ψ1 =〈b1||a1〉
t1 t t2
✲
|b2〉, E2 : Ψ2 =〈b2||a1〉
Figure 1. No intermediate measurement is made. Two ensembles result: E1, with two-state vector Ψ1 = 〈b1||a1〉;
and E2, with two-state vector Ψ2 = 〈b2||a1〉.
Now they consider each subensemble individually, asking the counterfactual question:
If we had measured the spin of these particles along direction c (i.e., observable σc) at
a time t between t1 and t2, what would have been the probability for outcome c1?
They use the ABL rule to calculate the probability of outcome c1 for each subensemble
Ei for such a counterfactual measurement. They then show that the total probability of
outcome c1 derived from the above calculation, taking into account the weights of the two
subensembles Ei, in general disagrees with the quantum mechanical probability, which is
given simply by |〈ci|a1〉|
2.
The result obtained by S&S depends on the assumption that the intervening σc mea-
surement has definitely not occurred. In counterargument I, Vaidman (1996a) argues that
it is permissible for his purposes to assume that the σc measurement actually occurred
because he wants to allow for the possibility of a counterfactual that is not necessarily
‘contrary to fact’. While Lewis (1973, p. 26) has argued cogently that one can have a
counterfactual with a true antecedent, such an argument is of no use here because Lewis’
counterfactual with true antecedent simply reduces to a material conditional. This brings
us back to the ordinary non-counterfactual reading of the ABL rule, which is not under
dispute.
In counterargument II, Vaidman (1996a, 1997a) claims that the S&S calculation is not
the right one. He shows that if one includes the dependence of the final measurement on
the intervening measurement, then the resulting P (c1|a1) is in fact equal to |〈c1|a1〉|
2.
However, what this ‘correction’ amounts to is assuming that the putative counterfactual
measurement has actually occurred–just as in counterargument I–since the ensembles have
been redefined to include the dependence on the intervening measurement. Thus, with the
ensembles redefined in this way, it appears we are no longer considering a counterfactual
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conditional of the form
P → Q (2)
(“If it had been the case that P, then it would have been the case that Q”) where
P= “observable C is measured” and Q = “the probability of outcome c1 is as given by
the ABL rule (applied to systems appropriately pre- and post-selected according to the
procedure of S&S)”, but instead the material conditional
P → Q. (3)
The basic conceptual problem is the following: in considering a counterfactual measure-
ment of the spin along c (observable σc), we must take into account all the effects of that
measurement on the system. Measurement of the observable σc results in a change in
the mixture M of post-selected ensembles Ei described by the two-state vectors 〈b1‖a1〉
and 〈b2‖a1〉: were we to make the intervening measurement, we would not have the mix-
ture M but rather the mixture M′consisting of the four subensembles E ′jk with weights
|〈bk|cj〉|
2|〈cj|a1〉|
2, where j, k = 1, 2. (See Figure 2.)
✲
Figure 2
|a1〉
|c1〉
|c2〉
|b1〉, E
′
11 : Ψ
′
11 = 〈b1||a1〉
(c1)
|b2〉, E
′
12 : Ψ
′
12 = 〈b2||a1〉
(c1)
|b1〉, E
′
21 : Ψ
′
21 = 〈b1||a1〉
(c2)
|b2〉, E
′
22 : Ψ
′
22 = 〈b2||a1〉
(c2)
t1 t t2
Figure 2: Intermediate measurement of σc. Four sub-ensembles result: E
′
jk, j, k = 1, 2, with associated two-state
vectors Ψ′jk = 〈bk||a1〉
(cj). The superscript (cj) indicates that the given sub-ensemble was obtained from systems
yielding outcome cj at time t. We also define ensembles ηk =
∑
j
E′jk to compare the statistical weights of those
ensembles having final outcome bk with those of the Ei, where i = k.
This dependence of the actual mixture, M or M′, obtaining at time t2 on whether or not
an intervening measurement is performed gives rise to a crucial difficulty which destroys
the validity of the counterfactual claim. In order to clarify this point, and to lay the
groundwork for a detailed critique of Vaidman’s counterargument II, we need some ideas
from philosophical theories of counterfactuals.
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The intuitive way to formulate truth-conditions for counterfactual statements is prob-
ably best exemplified by Goodman’s classic essay, “The Problem of Counterfactual Con-
ditionals” (1947). Goodman’s approach, now commonly referred to as the metalinguistic
account of counterfactuals, proposes that a counterfactual such as P → Q is true if and
only if its antecedent P implies (i.e., semantically entails) the consequent Q when P is
conjoined with suitable background conditions S and laws of nature L:
P → Q is true iff (P&S&L) |= Q. (4)
In addition to (4), a further condition is necessary to specify what sorts of facts can be
included in the collection of ‘suitable background conditions’ S. Some restrictions are no
doubt required, because certain propositions–for instance ¬P–result in the conjunction
in (4) being a contradiction, in which case P → Q is vacuously true (i.e., true for
any Q). Metalinguistic accounts describe the restriction on membership in S in terms
of ‘cotenability’: the notion that the holding of any condition belonging to S must be
independent of the truth value of P . Thus condition (4) must be augmented by a further
requirement :
The background conditions asserted by S must be cotenable with P . (4a).
For future reference, let us refer to the condition defined by (4) together with (4a) as
‘condition Γ’.
However (as discussed by Goodman, and more recently in Horwich 1988, Chapter 10),
the cotenability notion can only be defined within the metalinguistic account in terms of
the counterfactual P → S;4 so the metalinguistic account faces a circularity problem
in giving a satisfactory account of cotenability. Fortunately, one has recourse to more
successful theories of counterfactuals in order to give a rigorous account of cotenability
(for example, Lewis, 1973; and Stalnaker, 1968). While these theories are based on the
notion of possible worlds, they can also be expressed in terms of cotenability, as Lewis
(1973, p. 57) has shown. The failure of the counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule
can most easily be analyzed in terms of a failure of cotenability between the statement of
background conditions, S, and the antecedent P . Therefore, for convenience, the analysis
of truth-conditions for counterfactuals will first be discussed in terms of the metalinguistic
account’s cotenability notion, and later related to the possible worlds formulation.
Returning now to the discussion following equation (3), the counterfactual usage of the
ABL rule as studied in the S&S example faces a difficulty in that the mixture, M or M′,
obtaining at time t2 depends on whether or not an intervening measurement has been
performed at time t (compare figures 1 and 2). Since the mixture must enter into the
counterfactual calculation in the form of the weights of each of the component subensem-
bles, with their associated two-state vectors used as inputs in the ABL formula (1), the
characterization of the mixture obtaining at t2 must be included in the background con-
dition statement S in (4). Thus, the statement of background conditions S holding when
¬P holds becomes false when P holds and is therefore not cotenable with P (see footnote
4). By this criterion alone, it is clear that the counterfactual usage of the ABL rule fails
because condition Γ is not met: (4a) fails.
The S&S proof goes further than this by demonstrating that the counterfactual ABL
4More precisely, the condition for cotenability of S with P in the metalinguistic account is the con-
junction (¬P&S) & (P → S).
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probability based on the statement of the actual background condition holding when P
is false (i.e., when C is not measured and mixture M obtains) is incorrect. (Note that
had this background condition statement been cotenable with P , the same procedure
would yield a correct counterfactual probability. This is the case in the usual quantum
mechanical counterfactual calculation of the probability of the outcome of a measurement
at time t given the quantum state at time t′. In this case the background condition
is simply the quantum state at time t′, which does not depend on whether or not a
subsequent measurement is performed).
We now describe in detail the steps employed in the S&S proof. First, consider the
overall background conditions S obtaining when P is false. S consists of the statement
of contingent initial conditions S1 concerning events at time t1, as well as a statement
concerning events at time t2, which we shall call S2. Thus, S = S1&S2. In the S&S proof,
S1 corresponds to the initial preselected ensemble of particles in state |a1〉. S2 states that
mixture M obtains at time t2. It is clear that S2 follows from S1 when P does not hold;
i.e., from the laws of quantum theory asserted by L we have:
S1&L&¬P |= S2. (5)
S&S then consider a hypothetical case which differs from the actual one only in that the
antecedent P is true; i.e., C is measured at t. They derive the consequence R of the
conjunction of the background conditions S = S1&S2 , relevant quantum mechanical laws
L, and P :
S&L&P |= R. (6)
R states: “The probability of outcome c1 of an intervening measurement of observable
C is as given by the ABL rule and the rule of total probability applied to systems in the
mixture M.” Thus, R is equivalent to Q in (2), since the systems referred to in Q are the
systems obtaining when P does not hold, which must be those in mixture M. The explicit
calculation corresponding to (6) is:
P (c1|a1) = PABL(c1|a1&b1)P (b1|a1) + PABL(c1|a1&b2)P (b2|a1), (7)
where the left hand side of (7), P (c1|a1), is the probability referred to in the proposition
R. On the right hand side, the quantities PABL(c1|a1&bk), k = 1, 2 correspond to the
component of L asserting that the ABL rule gives the correct quantum mechanical prob-
ability for the given outcome of an intervening measurement for systems with pre- and
post-selected states 〈bk‖a1〉. The weighting factors P (bk|a1), k = 1, 2 correspond to the
component of L stating that the rule of total probability holds, together with background
condition statement S = S1&S2, since the weights are those obtained from ensembles
Ei, i = 1, 2. In terms of quantum theory, the quantities P (bk|a1) are given by
P (bk|a1) = |〈bk|a1〉|
2, (8)
which of course assumes that no intermediate measurement of σc has been performed.
8
However, note that the left hand side of (6) is false because it is not possible (in general)5
for both P and S2 to be true, given S1 and L (this being the failure of cotenability discussed
earlier). Therefore, the consequent R(= Q) may well be false.
The S&S strategy is to show that R is indeed false, by comparing R to the true con-
sequent Q′ which results in the case in which P holds and the problematic statement of
background conditions S has been replaced so as to ensure that the conjunction appearing
on the left hand side of (6) is true. Thus, S&S next consider what would actually occur
given the truth of P . There are two equivalent ways to do this. What S&S do is simply
to drop the inconsistent background condition statement S2, and derive the entailment
Q′ of the conjunction of S1 , P and L. Thus they perform the derivation:
S1&P&L |= Q
′. (9)
(9) The proposition Q′ states “The quantum mechanical probability for outcome c1 for
the given ensemble of particles (in this case, the pre-selected only ensemble) is as given
by the usual quantum mechanical conditional probability.” Thus the explicit calculation
corresponding to (9) is:
PQM(c1|a1) = |〈c1|a1〉|
2 (10)
Since the left hand side of (9) is now true, the consequent Q′ must be true.
However, it may not be readily apparent that Q′ really is the appropriate proposition
to compare with R, since it does not directly incorporate the ABL rule. In order to
show that Q′ is the correct proposition to compare with R, we now consider the second,
equivalent way of deriving the consequence of the conjunction of the correct background
conditions, L, and P . This consists of deriving the analog of R in (6) for the case in which
the background conditions are those obtaining when P is true. These correct background
conditions, which we shall call S ′, consist of the conjunction of S1 and S
′
2, where S
′
2 states
that subsequent to the intervening measurement P we have mixture M′consisting of the
four subensembles E ′jk and their associated weights.
In order to facilitate the comparison of S2 with S
′
2, we define the ensembles ηk =∑
j E
′
jk, j, k = 1, 2, where ηk is the ensemble composed of all systems found in state |bk〉
at time t2 for the case in which P holds (see Figure 2). Now, in direct analogy with (6),
we can derive the consequence R′ of the conjunction of S ′ with L and P :
S ′&L&P |= R′. (6′)
Note, just as in (9), that the left hand side of (6’) is true, so the consequence R′ must
be true. The proposition R′ states: “The probability for outcome c1 of an intervening
measurement of observable C is as given by the ABL rule and the rule of total probability
applied to systems in the ensembles ηk = E
′
1k + E
′
2k, k = 1, 2, resulting when P holds.”
The explicit calculation corresponding to (6’) is:
5The exception is when the post-selected systems referred to in S happen to be the same whether or
not P is true; for now we neglect these cases, which will be discussed in §4.
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PQM(c1|a1) = PABL(c1|a1&b1)Pσc(b1|a1) + PABL(c1|a1&b2)Pσc(b2|a1) (12)
In (12), PABL(c1|a1&bk) is the probability given by the ABL rule using states |a1〉 and
|bk〉 as inputs–just as in (7)–and Pσc(bk|a1) is the final probability of outcome bk given
that the intervening σc measurement was performed; i.e., the statistical weight of ηk.
Thus Pσc(bk|a1) is the analog of P (bk|a1) in (8) for the case in which the intervening
measurement has been performed. Explicitly,
Pσc(bk|a1) = P (bk|c1)P (c1|a1) + P (bk|c2)P (c2|a1) (13)
The right hand side of (13) is the weight of ηk, the first term being the weight of
subensemble E ′1k and the second term being the weight of subensemble E
′
2k. Using the
rule of total probability and (13), it may easily be verified that equation (12) is identical
to equation (10), as follows.
The right hand side of (12) can be rewritten, using (13), as
PABL(c1|a1&b1)
[
P (b1|c1)P (c1|a1) + P (b1|c2)P (c2|a1)
]
+
PABL(c1|a1&b2)
[
P (b2|c1)P (c1|a1)+P (b2|c2)P (c2|a1)
]
(14)
Noting that the quantities P (bk|cj) are implicitly conditional also on a1, i.e. they are
equivalent to P (bk|cj&a1), and for simplicity dropping the ‘ABL’ subscript (which does
not affect the calculation), (14) is equal to:
P (c1|a1&b1)
[
P (b1&c1|a1) + P (b1&c2|a1)
]
+
P (c1|a1&b2)
[
P (b2&c1|a1)+P (b2&c2|a1)
]
(15)
Using the rule of total probability, the quantities in brackets can be simplified, so that
(15) is equal to
P (c1|a1&b1)
[
P (b1|a1)
]
+ P (c1|a1&b2)
[
P (b2|a1)
]
(16)
Expression (16) can be rewritten as:
P (c1&b1|a1) + P (c1&b2|a1) (17)
which, again applying the rule of total probability, yields finally
P (c1|a1), (18)
which is exactly the quantity calculated in (10) using the conditional probability rule
of quantum mechanics. Therefore, despite the fact that the statement of background
condition S ′2 does not explicitly appear in (9), the propositionQ
′ derived from that formula
is the exact analog of R for the case in which P holds; i.e., Q′ is equivalent to R′.
We have therefore established that Q′ as derived in the S&S proof is indeed the correct
proposition to compare with R(= Q of (2)). Note that Q′–which must be true–will, in
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general, differ from R because the ABL rule referred to in R(= Q) applies specifically
to those systems in ensembles Ei, i = 1, 2, which actually obtain when the intervening
measurement has not been performed, i.e., when P does not hold ; and in general, it will be
the case that Ei 6= ηk when i=k. Therefore, in general R will be false. (Further clarification
of the relationship between Q,Q′, R, and R′ will be made in the subsequent discussion of
Lewis’ theory of counterfactuals and in the caption to Figure 3, which illustrates points
made in that discussion.)
Now we are in a position to pinpoint the error in Vaidman’s counterargument II as stated
in his (1997a,b). The core of counterargument II is the claim that the S&S proof (as well
as other inconsistency proofs along similar lines) 6 is flawed in that it assumes that no
intervening measurement has occurred in the ‘counterfactual world’ (which corresponds
to our hypothetical case of (6)). However, this claim is mistaken; it confuses derivation
(5), performed to obtain the statement of actual background conditions S2 entailed by
the conjunction of S1, L and ¬P , with the derivation applying to the hypothetical case
(6).
It might be objected that S = S1&S2 (in particular, S2) is not the appropriate statement
of background conditions for deriving consequence R in (6), and that we should use instead
S ′ as in (6’). However, this move cannot be justified for several reasons.
First, it turns out that S ′ is also not cotenable with P in the given situation, though
this failure of cotenability is less obvious than that of S. The failure of cotenability of
S ′ can best be seen through reference to Lewis’ theory of counterfactuals (1973, 1979).
According to Lewis, a counterfactual is a ‘variably strict conditional’: a type of strict
conditional requiring reference to what Lewis terms a set $i of ‘spheres of accessibility’ of
possible worlds defined with respect to the actual world i. Each sphere ζ
(k)
i ∈ $i contains
only those possible worlds that are similar to the actual world i according to a specified
similarity relation for $i. The spheres are centered on i and nested in a way that reflects
their closeness, or degree of similarity, to i. In other words, i is at the center of $i with
the smallest sphere ζ
(1)
i comprising worlds that are more similar to i than are any of the
worlds that are in spheres in ζ
(k)
i , with k > 1, but not in ζ
(1)
i (And so on for ζ
(2)
i , etc.).
According to Lewis, a counterfactual P → Q is vacuously true at i if and only if
no P -world (i.e., no possible world in which P is true) belongs to any sphere in $i, and
non-vacuously true at i if and only if some sphere ζ
(k)
i in $i contains at least one P -world
and the material conditional P → Q holds at every world in ζ
(k)
i (1973, p. 16). ζ
(k)
i is
also referred to as a ‘P-permitting sphere.’ As noted earlier, these truth-conditions can
be shown to be fully equivalent to those in metalinguistic theories through reference to
a natural definition of cotenability in terms of Lewis’ similarity relation between worlds.
Thus, Lewis defines a statement X as cotenable with P at a world i if and only if either
(1) X holds throughout $i or (2) X holds throughout some P -permitting sphere in $i.
The truth conditions can now be stated in terms of cotenability: P → Q is true at i iff
P and some auxiliary premise X , cotenable with P at i, logically imply Q (Lewis 1973,
p. 57).
Clearly, the statement S = S1&S2 is not cotenable with P at i according to the above
definition. But neither is S ′ = S1&S
′
2 , since it does not hold throughout any P -permitting
sphere in $i(see Figure 3).
6For example, Cohen (1995) and Miller (1996).
11
i.
S
¬S
$i
Figure 3
P
S ′&P&R′
S1&P&Q
′
Figure 3. Neither S nor S′ hold throughout any P -permitting sphere in $i. (It is assumed that L is true throughout
$i.) Note also that although we have S
′&P → R′ in the overlap region, and equivalently S1&P → Q
′, we would
need to have P → Q throughout a P -permitting sphere in order for the counterfactual P → Q to be true. But
in general, Q′ 6= Q. The quantity Q′ = R′ in the overlap region merely gives the ordinary quantum mechanical
probability for a measurement that has actually been performed. Note that neither R nor Q, being false, hold
anywhere in $i. (In exceptional cases where it turns out that S = S
′, we would have Q′ = R′ = R = Q, so the
counterfactual would be true. Such cases are discussed in Section 4.)
Therefore, the counterfactual (2) is still false if (6) is modified by substituting S ′ for
S. Though such a substitution would allow us to obtain the desired result that R = Q′,
this statement would now apply not to a counterfactual conditional but to a material
conditional: the situation in which the measurement has been made in the actual world.
This is in fact what Vaidman proposes in counterargument II, and it fails because, as
noted earlier, it removes the counterfactual element from the S&S example.
There is a more intuitive reason, however, why we should insist that the background
conditions S = S1&S2 are the correct ones for the counterfactual derivation (6) in this
particular case. This is because the counterfactual reading of the ABL rule uses as input
quantities on record at time t3 ≥ t2. That is, the situation is one in which a pre- and post-
selection measurement (but no intervening measurement) have already been performed;
thus the experimenters are in possession of recorded results for measurement outcomes at
both times t1 and t2. At that point, the question asked is a retrodictive question: “What
would have happened had I measured observable O at time t, t1 < t < t2?” In view of
the existence of actual results at t2, such results are an indelible part of the history of
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world i and cannot be disregarded. Note, furthermore, that such results are not limited to
single-system measurement outcomes but could also be statistical data on a large number
of measured systems, data which would clearly reflect the existence of ensembles Ei.
2. Time-symmetrized counterfactuals.
In this section, I review and criticize two definitions given by Vaidman for a proposed
‘time-symmetrized counterfactual,’ which he claims is the only type of counterfactual for
which the ABL rule can be considered to give correct counterfactual probabilities. I show
that both definitions fail, in general, to establish a valid counterfactual use of the ABL
rule. (In any case, it should be noted from the outset that neither Goodman’s, Stalnaker’s
nor Lewis’ theories are restricted to time-asymmetric counterfactuals, i.e., counterfactuals
whose consequent Q concerns events occurring at times later than, or whose background
conditions are limited to events occurring at times earlier than, that of events that are
the subject of the antecedent P .)
Vaidman (1996a, 1997a,b) argues that discrepancies like that in the S&S proof arise
because they make use of a time-asymmetric counterfactual, which he says is inappropriate
for calculations involving the ABL rule. He proposes a new type of time-symmetrized
counterfactual which he claims resolves these discrepancies. Vaidman has provided two
definitions. The first, which I will call Definition 1, appears as ‘interpretation c’ in (1996a):
Definition 1. “Counterfactual probability [is] the probability for the results
of a measurement if it has been performed in the world ‘closest’ to the
actual world.” (1996, p.9)
Definition 1 is not new, since the idea of formulating truth-conditions for counterfactuals
in terms of a ‘closest possible world’ has previously been proposed by Stalnaker (1968).
The novelty of Definition 1 as proposed by Vaidman consists in the choice of ‘selection
function’ (in Stalnaker’s terminology; cf. 1968, p. 120) that determines the closest possible
world. The closest possible world j is defined by Vaidman as the one in which all
measurements, excluding the intermediate measurement asserted by P , have the same
outcomes as in i. This amounts to ignoring the inequivalence of the mixtures M and
M′which gives rise to the cotenability problem discussed in section 2.
However, Vaidman’s argument for the legitimacy of ignoring the difference between the
mixture M in world i and the mixture M′in world j is flawed. His claim is that, since it is
postulated that the system is not disturbed between t and t2–the period during which the
mixtures differ–the difference between the mixtures has “no physical meaning.” (1996,
p.10) However, this is not the case, as can be shown if one considers an experiment along
the lines of the S&S example in which a large number N of instances is considered. In fact,
I will now show that, due to the physical constraints imposed by quantum mechanics, in
general there can be, for large N, no such “closest possible world” j .
The requirement for j is that all measurements, except the intervening one not occurring
in i, have the same outcomes as in i. Consider each run of the experiment in which the
spin-1
2
particle is preselected as ‘up along a’ (|a1〉). For each of these runs, when we find
final outcome |b1〉in i we must also find final outcome |b1〉in j and likewise for final outcome
|b2〉.
The experiment in i consists of the initial spin measurement along a and one subsequent
spin measurement at an angle θab (between directions a and b), while in j it consists of
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the initial a spin measurement and two subsequent measurements at relative angles θac
and θcb.
So (assuming the spin directions are in the same plane) we must have
θab = θac + θcb. (19)
Now, the fraction Fi(b1) of runs resulting in the particle being found up along θab in i
is given by the weight of ensemble E1, i.e.:
Fi(b1) = |〈b1|a1〉|
2 = cos2
(
θab
2
)
(20)
The fraction Fj(b1) of runs resulting in the particle being found up along θab in world j
is given by the weight of ensemble η1 , i.e.:
Fj(b1) = |〈b1|c1〉|
2|〈c1|a1〉|
2+|〈b1|c2〉|
2|〈c2|a1〉|
2 = cos2
(
θcb
2
)
cos2
(
θac
2
)
+sin2
(
θcb
2
)
sin2
(
θac
2
)
(21)
Since it is postulated that each run in j has the same outcome as in i, we must have
Fi(b1) = Fj(b1), i.e.:
cos2
(
θab
2
)
= cos2
(
θcb
2
)
cos2
(
θac
2
)
+ sin2
(
θcb
2
)
sin2
(
θac
2
)
(22)
(In other words, the weight of ensemble E1 must be equal to the weight of ensemble η1).
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However, (22) is in general not satisfiable for θab = θac + θcb. For example, if we take
θac = θcb = pi/4, we obtain:
1/2 ∼ .728 + .02 ∼ .749 (23)
Since the requirement (22) cannot in general be fulfilled, there is in general no closest
possible world j to support the symmetrized counterfactual that Vaidman proposes.
Vaidman has proposed a second definition for the time-symmetrized counterfactual
(1997a):
Definition 2. “If a measurement of an observable C were performed at time t,
then the probability for C = ci would equal pi, provided that the results of
measurements performed on the system at times t1 and t2 are fixed.” (1996a, p.9)
Definition 2 gives predictions consistent with quantum mechanics, if the phrase “the
results of measurements performed on the system at times t1 and t2 are fixed,” is intended
to stipulate that the ABL rule only applies to those individual systems that (i) are pre- and
post-selected in the time-symmetrized state 〈bk||a1〉, k = 1, 2, in the experiment actually
performed (in the S&S example, no intervening measurement having been made) and (ii)
7Actually, (22) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for validity of the counterfactual use of the
ABL rule. In certain cases, one may have the weights of Ei and ηk equal for i = k, but the actual
ensembles themselves cannot necessarily be identified: Ei 6= ηk (c.f. Bub and Brown, 1986, p. 2339). In
showing, however, that (22) is not satisfied in general, we show that even this necessary condition does
not hold and therefore this definition for a time-symmetrized counterfactual is, in general, untenable.
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would have been pre- and post-selected in the same state if, counterfactually, a different
measurement had been performed (in the S&S example, an intervening measurement
having been made). Since such a system is stipulated to have the appropriate two-state
vector for the counterfactual measurement as well as for the actual measurement (in this
case a measurement of the identity I), the non-counterfactual reading of the ABL rule
would in fact be applicable to such a system.
To clarify this point, let us augment the two-state vector notation with a subscript
specifying which observable has been measured at time t in the pre- and post-selection
of system K. Thus, if system K is preselected in state |a1〉and post-selected in state
|bk〉 via a measurement of observable I at time t, the two-state vector Ψ of system K is
Ψ = 〈bk||a1〉I . Let us say that system K is ”time-symmetrically fixed” in the sense of
Definition 2 iff we can substitute a proposed counterfactually measured observable O for
the observable I that was actually measured, and K would still have the same two-state
vector. Thus we can also assign to K the two-state vector Ψ′ = 〈bk||a1〉O. In virtue of the
fact that K can be described by Ψ′, we can then employ the non-counterfactual reading of
the ABL rule to calculate the probability P (x|a, b;O) where x is in the range of O, even
though O is not the observable that was actually measured.
However, since we only exist and conduct experiments in one world, we cannot get
to other counterfactual worlds and perform concurrent experiments there to find which
systems do have the same post-selection outcomes for various intervening measurements.
Since the counterfactual ABL probabilities only apply to the time-symmetrically fixed
systems, and we have no way of identifying these, any information provided by a coun-
terfactual interpretation of the ABL rule under Definition 2 would seem to have no clear
physical meaning.
An illustration of this difficulty of Definition 2 is given in figure 4. In the actual world
i, we conduct an experiment in which electrons are pre- and post-selected in the state
|z+〉 (up along z). We perform an intervening measurement of σθ, where θ =
pi
2
. If we
start with 16 pre-selected electrons, a possible (ideal) distribution of measurement results
is shown.
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Figure 4
(a) |z1〉
|θ1〉
|θ2〉
|z1〉
|z2〉
|z1〉
|z2〉
S2,S7,S10, S12
S1, S4, S6, S8
S3, S5, S15, S16
S9, S11, S13, S14
(b) |z1〉
|φ1〉
|φ2〉
|z1〉
|z2〉
|z1〉
|z2〉
S1,S3, S4, S6,S7,S10, S11, S13, S14
S2, S5, S9
S8
S12, S15, S16
(a) In the actual world i, 16 systems preselected in the state |z1〉 are subjected to an intervening measurement of
σθ, where θ =
pi
2
with respect to the z axis, and a final post-selection measurement of σz. A possible (statistically
ideal) distribution is shown.
(b)In a counterfactual world j , the same 16 systems are subjected to an intervening measurement of σφ, where
φ = pi
3
with respect to the z axis, and again a final post-selection σz measurement. A possible (statistically ideal)
distribution is shown.
Only the three systems in bold-face, S3, S7, and S10, qualify as having their pre- and post-selection measurement
outcomes ‘time-symmetrically fixed’ for state 〈z1||z1〉. Applying the ABL rule for a counterfactual measurement
of intervening observable σφ to any other systems having the symmetrized state 〈z1||z1〉 in world i would give
incorrect probabilities for those systems.
Now, we ask the counterfactual question: “Consider a different angle φ = pi
3
. What
would have been the probability of getting the result +1 were we to have measured σφ
at t, instead of σθ?” In order to apply the ABL rule only to time-symmetrically fixed
systems, we have to imagine this measurement performed concurrently in a counterfactual
world j , and choose only those systems post-selected in state |z+〉 in j . However, not all of
the systems post-selected in the actual world i via the σθ measurement would necessarily
be post-selected in j via the σφ measurement. (See figure 4).
The only systems which are pre- and post-selected as |z+〉 in both worlds in this exam-
ple are S3, S7, and S10. These qualify as having their outcomes fixed in a time-symmetric
sense. But since we are only actually performing the experiment in i, we do not know
which of our 8 systems with state 〈z + ||z+〉 in i have fixed outcomes for other possible
experiments in other possible worlds such as j . For example, were we to apply the coun-
terfactual ABL reading to systems S2, S5, S12, S15, or S16, we would be using it incorrectly
since these systems do not have outcome |z+〉 in the counterfactual world j and therefore
do not qualify as having fixed outcomes at both times, as is required for the symmetrized
counterfactual. But there is no way to know this. Again, there is no way to make use of
the information provided by the counterfactual ABL rule according to Definition 2; nor
is it even clear that the notion of ‘time-symmetrically fixed’ is physically meaningful.
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4. Limited counterfactual ABL interpretation and the ‘advanced action’
concept.
I will now discuss a special case in which Vaidman’s time-symmetrized counterfactual
interpretation may be correctly applied to the ABL rule. This is the case in which the
hypothetical intervening measurement is of either the pre-selection observable A or the
post-selection observable B. Before showing how this special case holds for Vaidman’s
time-symmetrized counterfactual, I note that it falls under a class of counterfactuals
identified by Cohen (1995) and Cohen and Hiley (1996) which they obtained by applying
the consistency conditions of Griffiths (1984) in his consistent histories interpretation.8
Cohen and Hiley found that a counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule can be
justified for a system preselected in state |ψ1(t1)〉 and postselected in |ψ2(t2)〉 if, for every
pair α, β of eigenvalues of operator C,
Re{〈ψ2(t)|Pα|ψ1(t)〉〈ψ1(t)|Pβ|ψ2(t)〉} = 0. (24)
where Pν is the projection operator onto the space of eigenstates with eigenvalue ν which
are the possible outcomes of a measurement of C at time t, t1 < t < t2.
9 It can easily
be seen that the above special case (i.e., with (α, β) from the set of eigenvalues either of
observable A or observable B–not both together) satisfies (24).
For example, if we choose B as the counterfactually measured observable, and the pre-
and post-selected states as |a1〉 and |b1〉 respectively, with H = 0, (24) becomes
Re{〈b1|b1〉〈b1|a1〉〈a1|b2〉〈b2|b1〉} = 0. (24a)
We see from the form of (24a) that any observable10 commuting with either the pre- or
post-selection observable will give rise to at least one factor consisting of an inner product
of orthogonal eigenvectors. Thus for such a case, (24) will always be satisfied.
Condition (24) is a powerful one because it provides a basis for assertions about the
ontological properties of systems between measurements: pre- and post-selection exper-
imental histories satisfying (24) permit inferences about the states of systems even at
times when no measurement is made.11
Let us now confirm that both of Vaidman’s definitions for a time-symmetrized counter-
factual succeed for this case (as indeed they must, since even an ordinary time-asymmetric
counterfactual reading of the ABL rule succeeds here). First, the existence of a closest
possible world j as postulated by Vaidman is permitted by condition (22) in this case. If
the observable measured at time t is the same as either the pre- or post-selection observ-
able, we have either (i) θac = 0 or (ii) θcb = 0. Putting each of these cases into (22), we
obtain:
cos2(
θab
2
) = cos2(
θcb
2
) (25i)
cos2(
θab
2
) = cos2(
θac
2
) (25ii)
8See also Griffiths (1996) and (1998).
9Equation (24) is derived under the assumption that the Pν are components of a decomposition of the
identity operator in terms of orthogonal projections satisfying the condition PλPν = δλνPν .
10More precisely, any observable satisfying the condition of footnote 9.
11For a detailed discussion of this interesting property, see Cohen (1995, p.4337).
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By way of (19), we have also that
θab = θcb for θac = 0, and (26i)
θab = θac for θcb = 0; (26ii)
thus, (25i and ii) are correct in each case. So therefore there does exist a ‘closest possible
world’ j for this special case, and Definition 1 is tenable.12
In addition, Definition 2 will also be tenable for this case, since all appropriately pre-
selected systems which are post-selected via no intervening measurement would also, with
probability 1, be post-selected via an intervening measurement of either the pre- or post-
selection observable. Thus all pre- and post-selected systems in world i can be considered
to be time-symmetrically fixed. We can see that this is the case by referring again to
condition (24). Consider a system preselected in state |a1〉 and post-selected in state
|b1〉 via no intervening measurement. According to condition (24), were we to make an
intervening measurement of observable B at time t, the probability of outcome |b1〉 would
be correctly given by the ABL rule; and that probability would be 1. Given that the
system is not disturbed between times t and t2, a post-selection measurement of B must
therefore find the system in state |b1〉. So we can therefore say that if B had been measured
at time t, the same individual system would still have been post-selected.
In order to show that a pre- and post-selected system in state 〈b1||a1〉 via no intervening
measurement would still be pre- and post-selected via an intervening measurement of
observable A, we note that a counterfactual measurement of A at a time ta, t1 < ta < t2,
would trivially confirm that the system is in state |a1〉. Then we again have to use (24)
together with the ABL rule and a counterfactual B measurement at time tb,
t1 < ta < tb < t2, to show that the system can be considered to be in the state |b1〉 at
a time tb after ta and before t2, even though B has not actually been measured. If the
system is in state |b1〉 prior to t2, and is not disturbed up until t2, then it must be post-
selected in that state upon being subjected to a post-selection measurement of B at t2.
Therefore, in this case, the system qualifies as time-symmetrically fixed, and Definition 2
is tenable.
Additional justification for a limited ABL counterfactual interpretation, i.e. for the
above special case, comes from Price’s concept of ‘advanced action’. This notion will be
briefly described below, along with his arguments for the claim that we live in a world
which exhibits advanced action.
Price (1996) raises an objection to the usual interpretations of quantum mechanics
based on their explicit time-asymmetry, which assumes his contested µinnocence (micro-
innocence) assumption: the notion that a quantum systems state depends on past inter-
actions but not future ones. The objection consists in the claim, for which Price argues
in his book, that there is no objective physical basis for such an asymmetry.
Price (p.187) discusses an example of a photon passing through two polarizers (a typical
TSQT situation). He observes that our ordinary time-asymmetric intuition is to say that,
with the history of the photon prior to the first polarizer held fixed (call this case (i)),
the state of the photon between the first and second polarizers will not change if the
12As an illustration of the point made in footnote 7, note that there is a case in which (22) is satisfied
but (24) fails: the case in which the intervening measurement is of a spin direction orthogonal to both a
and b. (In this case, the spin directions are not coplanar.) This is a case in which the weights of Ei and
ηk are equal for i = k, but the ensembles themselves are not.
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orientation of the future polarizer is changed. In terms of ensembles, this is the usual
quantum mechanical way of defining states and ensembles in terms of a preselection
measurement only. Now, in order to demonstrate the time-asymmetry of this intuition,
Price asks us to consider the temporal mirror image, call it case (ii), of the above case,
call it (i) (p. 187). Case (ii) is as follows: with the future of the photon after it passes the
second polarizer held fixed, changes in the orientation of the first polarizer will not affect
the state of the photon between the first and second polarizers. But we clearly reject
this view, because we consider that the state of the photon after it passes the polarizer is
dependent on the setting of that polarizer (p. 188).
Price argues that because standard quantum mechanics accepts case (i) but rejects case
(ii), it implicitly endorses an additional time asymmetry above and beyond what can
be accounted for by the usual time-asymmetric convention for assessing counterfactuals
(which assumes that only the past is fixed). Since the physics of the microworld reflects
no such asymmetry, Price views the above time-asymmetric residue as unacceptable, and
therefore argues that the world must exhibit advanced action. If advanced action is
admitted, then the asymmetry disappears because one rejects both cases above: the state
of the photon in the region between the polarizers depends on the orientation of both the
past and future polarizers. On such a view, it does not make sense to define an ensemble
only in terms of a preselection measurement, because that single measurement does not
yield the maximal information about the photon. In a world with advanced action, the
photon has some additional predisposition based on the measurement to be made in its
immediate future.
In exactly the same way, TSQT advocates argue that the full description of a quantum
system, both in terms of its state description and any ensemble of which it would be
considered a member, requires that one take into account such future measurements.
Hence they argue that such systems should be labeled by a two-state vector rather than
a one-state vector (Price himself does not, however, refer to two-state vectors 〈Ψ‖Φ〉 in
his discussion of the time-symmetry of quantum theory).
How can the above considerations support a counterfactual reading of the ABL rule
for the special case described above? In a world with advanced action, the causal effects
of measurements are fully time-symmetric. That means we should be able to consider
an experiment of the kind discussed above (i.e., the photon passing two polarizers) from
either the usual temporal direction or the time-reversed direction, and either way should
correspond to a valid physical process.
Consider an experiment in which no observable (equivalently, the indentity I) is mea-
sured at the intermediate time t. Let our photon be described by the two-state vector
〈b1||a1〉; i.e., it will be pre- and post-selected to begin with eigenvalue a1 and to end up
with eigenvalue b1. Let the ABL probability of outcome x at time t be denoted by P (x; t).
Under the assumption that the ABL rule is valid only for intervening measurements that
have actually been performed (call this the ‘strict ABL assumption’), it is invalid to use
the ABL rule to calculate P (b1; t) for a counterfactual measurement of B in this situation.
Yet, we also know that the photon is going to end up in state |b1〉 at time t2. The ABL
rule gives the value 1 for P (b1; t). If the system is not disturbed at all between t and t2
(as is assumed), then this result seems fully consistent with that fact.
Now, one might argue that this merely reflects the arbitrary decision to postselect for
the state |b1〉 at t2, and that the value of P (b1; t) has nothing to do with the ontological
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state of the photon at that time (or at any time prior to t2). But this argument is
weakened in a fully time-symmetric world with advanced action. This can be seen by
viewing the same process from the time-reversed direction. (In the following, we denote
ABL probabilities applying to the time-reversed case by P*(x; t).)
Suppose we have a system “starting out” at time t2 in state |b1〉, no measurement
occurring at time t, and the system being found in state |a1〉 at time t1. Were we to
calculate P*(b1; t)and get the value 1, according to the strict ABL assumption we would
be using the ABL rule incorrectly. Yet the result P*(b1; t)= 1 correctly describes the actual
physical situation: we know that the photon must have the eigenvalue b1 at time t, since
it “started out” with that value (viewing the post-selection at t2 as the starting point).
The fact that we view the “incorrect” ABL usage in a different light depending on the
temporal direction considered should alert us to the fact that, as Vaidman or Price would
put it, we are operating under a “time asymmetry prejudice.” If we truly want to rule out
the “incorrect” use of the ABL rule, such a judgment should stand up to scrutiny when
viewed from either temporal direction. Yet, as shown above, when viewed in the time-
reversed direction, our argument for the rejection of the “incorrect” usage is considerably
weaker. (A similar argument, though not explicitly in terms of the ABL rule, can be
found in Griffiths (1984, pp. 238-9).)
5. Conclusion.
It has been argued that the counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule is not valid
in general. For the usual time-asymmetric counterfactual situation, as in the Sharp and
Shanks proof, it gives results generally inconsistent with quantum mechanics. Coun-
terarguments by Vaidman (1996a, 1997a,b) against this proof and against others like it
(Cohen, 1995 and Miller, 1996) fail because they fail to take into account the fundamental
cotenability problem posed by the counterfactual use of the ABL rule, and mistakenly
identify as a flaw what is actually an appropriate application of background conditions
for evaluation of the counterfactual statement. Proposed definitions for a new kind of
time-symmetric counterfactual are problematic in that they rely either on the notion of
a ‘closest possible world’ that in general does not exist, or on a time-symmetric fixing
requirement that is generally impossible to fulfill.
However, there is an interesting special case in which the ABL rule may be correctly
used in a counterfactual sense: that in which the hypothetical intervening measurement
is that of an operator that commutes with either the pre- or post-selection operator.13
This case is a member of a class identified by Cohen and Hiley which satisfies a condition
derived from Griffith’s consistent histories approach. In this case, both definitions of the
time-symmetrized counterfactual are satisfied: there does exist a closest possible world,
and the time-symmetrical fixing requirement can be fulfilled. Moreover, a counterfactual
interpretation of the ABL probabilities in this case can be further supported by considering
a physical picture that includes Price’s advanced action concept.
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